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biographisch-realen Bedingungen des (niemals endgültig gewußten) Vollzugs transzendentaler Freiheit zu stellen und zu beantworten. Kant selbst hat in seiner Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht solche Differenzen unmißverständlich bezeichnet. Das transzendentale Geschäft hielt er prinzipiell für vollendet, als er geschichtlich-biographisch die Menschwerdung des Menschen in seiner Faktizität und
Transfaktizität, als sich in seiner Freiheit selbst erzeugendes Wesen in den Blick
nahm. Beide Perspektiven, die transzendentale Argumentation und die leiblich-geschichtlich-lebensgeschichtliche Selbsterfahrung des Menschen gehören letztlich untrennbar zusammen. Diese strukturierte Erfahrung des Menschen bzw. der Menschheit mit sich selbst fällt indes nicht einfach mit den Kategorien und Befunden der
Sozialwissenschaften zusammen. Diese Erfahrung hat vielmehr den Charakter der
Kunde, der Historia. Ihr Erkenntnisanspruch unterscheidet sich deutlich von dem
der einzelwissenschaftlichen Hypothesenzusammenhänge. Sie sind nur ein Subsystem im umgreifenden Kontext der Kunde, die ihrerseits den transzendentalphilosophischen Vorgaben durchgängig verpflichtet bleibt. Kants triadisches humanwissenschaftliches Modell vermag das Nielandtsche Konzept in sich aufzuheben und
der zeitgenössischen Pädagogik ebenso wie den anderen Wissenschaften vom Menschen und Praxeologien grundsätzliche systematische Möglichkeiten zu eröffnen.
Ein für die Pädagogik höchst bedeutsamer Nebeneffekt wäre, die von Herbart initiierte Eliminierung der transzendentalen Freiheit aus der pädagogischen Denkwelt
und ihre schlichte, folgenreiche Substitution durch den empirisch gemünzten Begriff
der Wahlfreiheit in einer Systematik von Freiheiten aufheben zu können. Wesentliche Intentionen Nielandts könnten in diesem umgreifenden Modell ihre Erfüllung
finden.
Erwin Hufnagel, Mainz

Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to
Come Forward as Science. Translated and edited, with an introduction, and selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: University Press 1997, xliv ⫹ 188 pages (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy).
Kant thought highly of his Prolegomena. Thus he said: “I’ll guarantee that no
one who has thought through and comprehended the principles of critique, even
if only in these prolegomena, will ever again return to that old and sophistical
pseudoscience.” (AA 4:366) One might argue that any adequate edition of this text
should make clear what the author’s intention was. Gary Hatfield’s edition seems
to rise to this challenge. If students “return to that old and sophistical pseudoscience”, it will not be because of lack of effort on Hatfield’s part. In his Introduction
he outlines Kant’s project of reforming metaphysics by revealing its roots in the
metaphysics of his time. He seems to think that it derives mainly from the work of
Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Locke, and Hume, for these are the names
he mentions. One might have wanted to hear something of Euler, Mendelssohn,
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Lambert, Tetens or other more closely related German contemporaries as well,
especially since these thinkers are still not as well known among English readers of
Kant as they should be.
After giving a basic description of Kant’s particular approach to metaphysics and
a concise account of his life and writings (with an additional tabular chronology),
he provides some useful Notes on terminology, such as analytic/synthetic, analytic/
dialectic, logic, subject/object, or deduction. He then purports to give a sketch of
the Structure of the work, which regrettably turns out to be not much more than
a synoptic table of contents (xxvi⫺xxxii). This is followed by hints for Evaluating
the critical philosophy, which include such catchwords as “thing in itself”, or the
“historization of the categories”, etc. But, due to the limits of this Introduction,
Hatfield does not discuss some of the relevant literature on these topics.
Hatfield provides no bibliography but only references to a Further reading, consisting mainly of classical texts on the Critique, English translations of Kant’s
works, and Biographies. A bibliography would be problematic because there are
not many books and articles dealing specifically with the Prolegomena and because
all literature on the Critique is also relevant for the Prolegomena.
The text itself is primarily based on the eighth edition of Vorländer’s text (Felix
Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1976). This is especially relevant insofar as the so-called
“Blattversetzungshypothese” by H. Vaihinger is concerned, according to which five
paragraphs from section 4 have been placed into section 2. However, Hatfield fails
to discuss this hypothesis, simply taking for granted the reliability of the Vorländer
text.
Hatfield’s translation is new, but “on occasion” Hatfield draws on earlier translations, especially that of P. G. Lucas (Manchester, 1953) and on L. W. Beck’s revised
Carus text (Indianapolis, 1950). He follows the editorial principles of the Cambridge Series: “seek terminological consistency, avoid sacrificing literalness for ostensible ease in reading, preserve Kant’s own sentence and paragraph breaks, keep
emendations and interpolations to a minimum …” (xli). In some respects Hatfield
departs from standard translations, e. g. “sensory intuition” instead of “sensible
intuition” (sinnliche Anschauung), in cases in which the adjective sinnlich is used
to indicate the kind of cognition, rather than to describe an object as being capable
of being sensed. He translates Erkenntnis as “cognition” rather than as “knowledge”. The reason for this departure lies, according to Hatfield, in the process
character of the Kantian “Erkenntnis” that is better expressed by the English “cognition” than “knowledge” which Hatfield characterizes as a product of cognition.
But in the case of “Selbsterkenntniß” (AA 4:317, 328) the text reads “knowledge
of itself”. One may at least doubt whether the translator’s criterion of the process
character holds in those passages. But in general, Hatfield handles very carefully
central concepts of the Kantian text that are difficult to translate. Thus he adds
two textual notes to the Kantian sentence: “All synthetic a priori principlese are
nothing more than principlesf of possible experience.” Principlese are eGrundsätze,
and principlesf are fPrinzipien (66). The English reader can therefore decide for
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himself or herself whether there are significant differences between Grundsätze and
Prinzipien in Kant’s Prolegomena.
Below the Kantian text there are, beside those textual notes, some factual notes
containing useful comments, e. g. an explanation of the term “rhapsody” (77) which
Kant uses to characterize Aristotle’s ‘table’ of categories.
The edition contains a helpful and extensive Index but the reader may miss a
tabular, and commented glossary for an overview of the Kantian terminology and
its English equivalent.
Also included in this new edition are selections from the Critique of Pure Reason
(Parts from the Preface to the second edition, Parts from the Introduction to the
second edition, §§ 1⫺2 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, including the Metaphysical
Exposition of the Concept of Space [B-edition], Parts from the Transcendental Analytic, including § 13 On the principles of transcendental deduction in general, Parts
from the First Antinomy, and a very small portion of the Transcendental Doctrine
of Method) to let Kant explain his own terminology and to give further statements
on his critical philosophy. But there seems to be some arbitrariness in the choice of
those passages. The Critique is well known and readily available. The reader has
to consult the Critique anyway ⫺ and not just, nor even foremost, the passages
included in this edition. Perhaps it would have been more helpful to include the socalled “Göttingen Review” (Garve/Feder) as an appendix instead. This review is
more difficult to get and it would have provided some of the essential background
of the work. Furthermore, there are some reflections by Kant that were obviously
written in immediate connection with the Prolegomena. They are included as “Vorarbeiten zu den Prolegomena” in R. Malter’s edition of the Prolegomena (Reclam,
1989), but they are as yet untranslated.
In sum, this edition is ⫺ in spite of some minor shortcomings ⫺ an improvement
over existing editions. While it is to be hoped that the forthcoming volume of the
Cambridge edition of Kant’s works, which will contain Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy After 1781 will remedy even these shortcomings, it seems to be the best translation available at the moment. It can be highly recommended especially for University Courses, and that means “for the use of apprentices” (against Kant’s own will
⫺ cf. AA 4:255).
Konstantin Pollok, Marburg

Peter L. Oesterreich: Das gelehrte Absolute. Metaphysik und Rhetorik bei Kant,
Fichte und Schelling. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1997, 205 S.
Der Vf. beginnt mit der Feststellung, daß am „Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts
[…] die Rhetorik zunehmend die Züge eines neuen universalen Paradigmas [gewinnt], das alle wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen zu erfassen scheint“ (S. 5), die er zugleich mit der Perspektive verbindet, daß Rhetorik und Metaphysik überhaupt nicht
unvereinbar seien. Der Vf. will „eine positive Perspektive der gegenwärtigen Rhet-
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